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World War II cost the lives of approximately 55 million people, mostly civilian
non-combatants, and saw the commission of widespread human rights atro-
cities on all sides. The mass murder conducted by Nazi Germany in its con-
centration and extermination camps and other human rights atrocities which
were committed by its armed forces and security personnel mainly in Eastern
Europe led to the establishment of the international military tribunal of Nur-
emberg in 1946.
Consequently, the four main victors of World War II, the United States of
America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France, decided to bring the
perpetrators of the defeated enemy to justice before their ‘‘own’’ international –
albeit allied – tribunal,1 with the prosecution following the explicit objective
that ‘‘justice and not revenge’’ should be the main motive behind it. Conse-
quently, the United States’ view that the defendants were to be granted a fair
trial dominated.2 Or, as their chief prosecutor, Jackson, stated in his well-
known opening address, ‘‘the four great nations flushed with victory and stung
with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive
enemies to the judgment of law’’.3
The international military tribunal4 at Nuremberg was established5
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1 See United Nations War Crimes Commission Law – Report of Trials of War Criminals (1949) IX
referring to the fact that the Leipzig court cases had shown that the prosecution of war criminals
before their own domestic courts did not achieve the desired effects in respect of establishing the
factual context of the committed crimes and deterrence.
2 See art 1 and 16 of the Nuremberg Charter. It was mostly the USA that urged the other three
powers to follow this principle, and the understanding of justice somehow differed among the
powers: eg, the British favoured the idea of executing all German leaders without a formal trial.
See Hogan-Doran ‘‘Aggression as a crime under international law and the prosecution of
individuals by the proposed international criminal court’’ 1996 Netherlands International Law
Review 330 et seq. Stalin favoured this procedure as well but suggested a pro forma trial in the
tradition of the Soviet purgation trials of the thirties. See Steyn ‘‘Guantanamo Bay: the legal
black hole’’ 2004 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 9 n 33.
3 See Heydecker and Leeb Der Nu¨rnberger Prozeß (1958) 534.
4 Judges and prosecution consisted of allied personnel alone. The fact that no member of a
‘‘neutral’’ state was allowed to participate in the trials already questions the nature of the
international military tribunal as being ‘‘international’’.
5 The Tokyo tribunal was established in 1946 and had jurisdiction over crimes committed by the
Japanese in the Far East. Its jurisdiction, procedure and powers followed the Nuremberg Charter.
It sentenced 25 Japanese war criminals out of the original 28 accused. See Ratner and Abrams
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following the joint declaration6 of the four victors in their ‘‘London Agreement
of 8 August 1945 for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis’’.7 The tribunal’s main purpose was the
‘‘just and prompt’’ trial and punishment of the major war criminals of Ger-
many.8 The establishment of the two post-World War II criminal ad hoc tri-
bunals for the prosecution of the main war criminals of the Axis powers in
Nuremberg and Tokyo established without a doubt a new accountability me-
chanism for human rights atrocities under international law. But 60 years on
there still remain questions about the legality and eventual legacy of these
tribunals.
This article focuses on the international military tribunal at Nuremberg9,
describing its law, the main criticism of its legality and partiality and its impact
on the shaping of international law. It also explores the issue of whether there
could have been judicial alternatives to the establishment of the tribunal.
2 The law
2.1 Jurisdiction and sentencing
The tribunal had jurisdiction ‘‘ratione materiae’’ under article 6 (a) to (c) of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal10 over the following three of-
fences: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Article 6
clarifies that this law constituted ‘‘new’’ retroactive law which was to be un-
affected by existing domestic provisions.11 The Nuremberg Charter excluded
the admissibility of the defences of superior orders, command of law and act-
of-state immunity,12 thereby extending the court’s jurisdiction ‘‘ratione perso-
nae’’ to former heads of state such as the last Reichskanzler of the Third Reich,
Admiral Do¨nitz.13 The charter established not only individual criminal respon-
sibility14 but group responsibility as well.15
6 The Allied Powers had already declared in their Moscow declaration of 30 October 1943
‘‘Concerning responsibility of Hitlerites for committed atrocities’’ their intent to try all German
war criminals.
7 ‘‘The (London) Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal’’ 82 United Nations Treaty
System 280, entered into force 8 Aug 1945.
8 ibid, art 1.
9 The terms ‘‘court’’ and ‘‘tribunal’’ are used interchangeably.
10 The latter is referred to as Nuremberg Charter as well.
11 ibid, art 6: ‘‘whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.’’
See Renz ‘‘Vo¨lkermord als Strafsache. Vor 35 Jahren sprach das Frankfurter Schwurgericht das
Urteil im großen Ausschwitz-Prozess’’, essay, retrievable at http://www.fritz-bauer-institut.de/
texte/essay/08-00_renz.htm, 6 et seq. This provision is also of relevance for the ‘‘mistake of law’’
defence, see below under } 2.2.3.
12 ibid art 7 and 8.
13 who succeeded the ‘‘Fu¨hrer’’ Adolf Hitler as German head-of-state after the latter’s suicide in
April 1945.
14 art 6 of the Nuremberg Charter.
15 ibid art 9 and 10. Art 9 reads: ‘‘At the trial of any individual member of any group or
organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may
be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a
criminal organization.’’ See Jo/ rgensen The Responsibility of States for International Crimes
(2003) 61-62 for a detailed account.
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